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ABSTRACT
Over the last thirty years, there never has been a more confused doctrine than the current “duty of 
reasonable care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party logistics companies and shippers as they 
select carriers for transport. The confusion in what was once reasonable and well understood law has 
been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty empirical 
data, the complete failure of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to properly 
assess carrier safety worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar and apathy by many in the 
industry. The purpose of this commentary is to examine how this uncertainty developed, to identify 
some of the more glaring issues that must be addressed, and to give some possible guidance as to 
how the industry, FMCSA and courts should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in complying
with “reasonable care” in selecting carriers.
INTRODUCTION
During thirty years as a transportation attorney, 
general counsel to three third-party logistics 
companies and former CEO of a logistics 
company, there never has been a more confused 
doctrine than the current “duty of reasonable 
care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party 
logistics companies and shippers as they select 
carriers for transport. The confusion in what 
was once reasonable and well understood law 
has been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial 
reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty 
empirical data, the complete failure of the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) to properly assess carrier safety 
worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar 
and apathy by many in the industry in the face of 
some potentially serious challenges to the future 
of competition in both the carrier and broker 
sectors of the industry.
The purpose of this commentary is to examine 
how this uncertainty developed, to identify some 
of the more glaring issues that must be 
addressed, and to give some possible guidance 
as to how the industry, FMCSA and courts 
should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in 
complying with the “reasonable care” standard 
for selecting carriers.
Since the inception of the property broker 
concept, brokers have for the most part been 
held to a very limited duty of reasonable care 
and diligent inquiry in the selection of carriers 
for transport. As will be shown, the wisdom of 
fifty years of state and federal courts construing 
this duty to be limited is much more well- 
founded than the more recent and patently 
unsound extensions of this duty, requiring 
brokers to be an ombudsman of safety 
determinations in lieu of the FMCSA.1 *For all of 
the twentieth century a broker’s duty with slight 
exception was usually construed to mean that
1 SeeChubb Group of Insurance Companies v. H.A. Transportation Systems, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal.
2002); CGU Int 7 Ins., PTC v. Keystone Lines Corp. , 2004 WL 1047982. *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2004); Schramm v. 
Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2004); Jones v. C lI. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
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brokers had to confirm that carriers they hired 
satisfied the following requirements:
1. Authorized by what is now the FMCSA;
2. Had regulatory mandated minimum 
insurance coverage; and
3. Were competent insofar as any knowledge 
the broker had or with reasonable care could 
ascertain.2
Perhaps the Foster case' in 1969 was the first 
real inroad into a broader duty by brokers. It 
was clearly a precedent for some of the very 
vague, ambiguous and judicial activist reasoning 
and extremely poor direction by the Maryland 
district court in the Schramm case. The Schramm 
case, and its mandate that brokers/third party 
logistics companies must look to a data base 
(FMCSA’s Safety Status Measurement System, 
“SafeStat”) that was full of error, and invalid as 
a predictor of carrier safety worthiness, pivoted 
off of Foster. It required that brokers look to a 
source that could only create continued 
confusion for brokers and shippers, since both 
the SafeStat system and its successor, Safety 
Management System (SMS), have been shown 
to provide misleading and incomplete 
information from which it is virtually impossible 
to determine carrier safety worthiness, as will be 
more thoroughly discussed herin.
If one is to properly address the current enigma 
faced by brokers in their “new’' duty of 
reasonable care in selecting carriers, decision­
makers must understand how the fallacy of this 
new duty was developed, with some hope that a 
better understanding of this unfortunate rule of 
law will be completely corrected.
ANALYSIS
I. The Foster Case and 1 low it Was Bad Law
and a Faulty Foundation for Schramm
The Foster case involved a shipper (Foster) who 
had selected a carrier that was involved in an 
automobile accident in which persons were 
seriously injured, after the brakes on the carrier’s 
truck failed. Plaintiffs, in addition to statutory 
and regulatory infractions that are not pertinent, 
alleged that the broker was negligent for 
selecting “...an incompetent and careless 
contractor (carrier)”. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reasoned first that the evidence was 
insufficient to hold that Foster could have 
known of prior acts of negligence by the carrier 
of such number or magnitude to have found the 
carrier to be incompetent or careless. They also 
found that Foster had no actual knowledge of 
cither poor reputation or lack of authority on the 
part of the carrier.* 4 5
Had the Court stopped there, as they should 
have, the ambiguous reasoning and inexplicable 
duties for brokers pronounced in the Schramm 
(2004) case perhaps would never have been 
visited upon the truck brokerage industry. The 
Foster (1969) court could have followed the 
conclusion reached in Mooney v. Stainless, Inc, a 
1964 case out of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.1
... we believe the better rule to be that in 
order to render an employer liable under 
the theory of negligent selection of an 
independent contractor in cases such as 
the one at bar, it is necessary to establish 
that, at the time of hiring, the employer 
had either actual or constructive 
knowledge that the independent 
contractor was incompetent.6
2 L.B. Foster Company v. Hurnhlad, 418 F. 2d 727, 730 (9th C’ir. 1969) 
3Id.
4 Foster, at 730, 731.
5 338 F. 2d 127 (6lh Cir. 1964)
6 Id. at 131
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In addition, the mere fact that an independent 
contractor might subsequently engage in a 
negligent act raises no presumption that the 
employer was negligent in selecting the 
independent contractor for the job.7
Instead, as in so many cases where it seems that 
legal reasoning is replaced with the purpose of 
sustaining a sympathy verdict, the Foster court 
found that where direct evidence of negligence is 
missing, a jury can infer negligence by a 
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of 
experience, poor financial condition, failure to 
respect certificate requirements, and willingness 
to do business at cut rates.”8 From this premise, 
notwithstanding a total lack of affirmative proof 
of incompetence, or prior negligence, the Court 
went on to find that Foster “...failed to make a 
reasonable inquiry as to [the carrier’s] 
competence.”9
If we are to understand the fallacy of the new 
duty of due care placed upon brokers by the 
Schramm court (and courts that have followed), 
we must first realize that Foster was the only 
case cited by Schramm as a premise for the 
“new” duty of reasonable care and standard for 
“reasonable inquiry”. Also, since the Foster 
case was apparently the first court decision to 
supplant direct evidence of prior knowledge of 
carrier negligence with inference of negligence 
based upon the business acumen and financial 
sufficiency of the carrier, we must test that logic 
against our own fair analysis, before moving on 
to the failure of the Schramm court’s reasoning 
in establishing an impossible standard of care.
Return to Foster, and recall that the Foster court 
found no direct evidence of negligence by the 
shipper in selecting the carrier, but ruled instead
that negligence could be inferred by the shipper 
failing to make reasonable inquiry into the 
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of 
experience, poor financial condition, failure to 
respect certificate requirements, and willingness 
to do business at cut rates.”10 Assume arguendo 
that a broker finds a carrier for which he knows 
of no prior negligence or incompetence. The 
broker then finds that the carrier has the 
following characteristics:
1. The carrier is new and may have the 
best drivers and equipment in the 
business, but because the carrier is 
new, there exists a “lack of 
experience”.
2. Has some weak financials, as all start­
ups and many solid performance 
carriers do, thus is currently in “poor 
financial condition”.
3. I las certificates of authority that may 
be conditional because they are new, 
or may have lapsed because of 
administrative inefficiency.
4. Is willing to cut rates in order to gain 
business, as will many very safe 
carriers who have a “willingness to do 
business at cut rates”.
Assume further that the broker contracts with 
this carrier to deliver a load, knowing of no prior 
acts of negligence and finding that the carrier is 
not rated as “Unsatisfactory” by the FMCSA. 
After the carrier accepts the load, there is a 
horrible accident caused by the driver falling 
asleep. For the broker in our hypothetical, and 
the entire broker industry, how can any of the 
standards put forward by the Foster case help, or 
fairly be considered, in looking for the 
proximate cause of this accident, or finding that
Mooney, at 131. citing Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Johnson, 386 P. 2d 698 (Alaska); Strickland u State. 13 
\lisc.2d 925. 1 ~!1 N.Y.S.2d 983: Ever v. Ilehnar, 272 Mich. 513. 262 N.W. 298: Silveus r. Grossman. 307 Pa. 212. 161 
A. 362: 27 Am.Jur (Independent Contractors) 509
8 Foster, supra at 730
9 Id. at 731.
1°Id.
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the selection of the carrier by the broker was 
negligent. The answer is that such standards are 
of highly subjective quality and couldn’t 
possibly be helpful in the absence of direct proof 
of broker negligence. However, when courts 
allow juries to infer negligence from such weak 
logic, juries will too often create a path to a 
sympathetic verdict. Such standards are 
contradictions of sound judicial reasoning, 
which have in the past required direct evidence 
that the broker had actual or constructive 
knowledge that the carrier was incompetent, 
before attributing to the broker culpability for 
negligent hiring.
The Foster court cited no authority for their 
highly subjective standard for reasonable 
inquiry. As in most bad law, they reasoned 
backward to reach their result, by giving us a 
checklist of business acumen, rather than a solid 
inquiry standard. The suggested list of criteria 
for an inference of negligence is immediately 
exposed as fallacious when made a part of the 
following:
• All carriers having poor financials and 
willing to do business at cut rates are 
negligent
• Carrier “A” has never had an accident 
until now, has poor financials, lack of 
experience and is willing to do business 
at cut rates.
m Therefore, Carrier “A” must be 
negligent.
One does not have to be an expert in argument 
form to see how this syllogism stands out as 
invalid. Further, other courts have considered 
this very argument and correctly found that 
business acumen and financial responsibility 
have no place in such analysis.
As to the first point, we reject the notion 
that financial irresponsibility is cither 
equivalent to or a category of 
incompetence. Cassano v. Aschoff.’ 226 
N.J.Super. 110, 116.543 A.2d 973. 
certif. denied, 113 N.J. 371, 550 A.2d 
476 (1988): see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 411 comment g 
(1965) (“The rule stated in this Section 
makes the employer responsible only for 
his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
employ a contractor who is competent 
and careful. It has no application where 
the contractor, although competent... is 
financially irresponsible.”).11
Equating lack of insurance and financial 
responsibility with incompetence might 
also wreak havoc in particular 
industries, such as transportation, 
because persons or entities contracting 
for transportation services would be 
required to make continuing inquiry into 
the financial qualifications of the 
contractor.12 [emphasis added]
Foster was bad law. Howcver, it was clearly the 
faulty foundation for worse law by the Schramm 
court, thirty-four years later. Both Foster and 
Schramm are seemingly examples of how bad 
law is often created by courts looking for social 
justice where a tragic accident has occurred, or 
reaching too far in creating a duty that has not 
heretofore existed. They both remind us of 
Justice Holmes’ often mis-paraphrased 
comment, “Great cases like hard cases make bad 
law. For great cases are called great, not by 
reason of their real importance in shaping the 
law of the future, but because of some accident 
of immediate overwhelming interest which 
appeals to the feelings and distorts the 
j udgment.”13
11 Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117. 707 A.2d 977 (N.J.. 1998).
12 Id. at 139, citing Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co, 4 F 3d 237 at 242.
13 Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197,400-401.
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II. The Schramm Court Rules that Brokers
Must Reference an Invalid Database
(SafeStat).
The Schramm case, involved an accident in the 
state of Maryland, caused when the carrier failed 
to stop at an intersection and plaintiffs’ 
automobile collided with the carrier’s vehicle. 
Injuries to the plaintiffs were catastrophic and 
permanent. The Maryland District Court 
considered a motion for summary judgment and 
granted all parts of the motion, except for that 
part relating to negligent hiring of the carrier by 
the broker. With the seed of illogical “reasonable 
inquiry” planted by Foster, what followed was 
the sine qua non for the Schramm court to give 
us the new and intractable duty for transportation 
brokers:
This duty to use reasonable care in the 
selection of carriers includes, at least, 
the subsidiary duties (1) to check the 
safety statistics and evaluations of the 
carriers with whom it contracts 
available on the SafeStat database 
maintained by FMSCA, [italics mine] 
and (2) to maintain internal records of 
the persons with whom it contracts to 
assure that they are not manipulating 
their business practices in order to avoid 
unsatisfactory SafeStat ratings.14
Perhaps the Schramm court was looking at least 
in part for a more objective standard of 
reasonable inquiry than what they saw in the 
Foster decision. Perhaps they saw the same 
inadequacy in such a business acumen test as 
demonstrated here. However, they unknowingly 
resorted to requirements that could not produce a 
more reliable result when followed. In fairness 
to the Schramm court, they apparently did not 
know that their effort at a more objective 
standard of reasonable care was doomed by the
completely inadequate authority they chose for 
inquiry into carrier safety, i.e., ”... the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA.”
In fact, these “subsidiary duties” were on the day 
announced counterproductive to any notion of 
improving the process of selecting safe carriers. 
Furthermore, the sanction of such a useless 
process by a federal district court both greatly 
confused the former duty of reasonable care for 
transportation brokers, and at the same time 
allowed FMCSA to further avoid its duty to be 
the one and only entity to administer, evaluate 
and determine carrier safety worthiness.
Consider the first “subsidiary duty” announced 
by the district court:
“(1) to check the safety statistics and 
evaluations of the carriers with whom it 
contracts available on the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA.” 15
To scrutinize fairly the rationale by which the 
Schramm court pronounced this duty, one must 
ask: What would the broker in the Schramm 
case have found had they looked carefully at 
SafeStat, prior to selecting the carrier involved 
in the ensuing accident? The accident and 
concomitant duties of the broker which were the 
subject of the court’s analysis occurred on May 
2, 2002, and the court’s decision was announced 
August 24, 2004. For the interim period between 
the date of the accident and the court’s analysis 
requiring brokers to look to the SafeStat system, 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of 
Inspector General reported the following on 
February 13, 2004:
1. Of 645,551 active interstate carriers 
on record, only 26 percent had 
sufficient data represented to 
compute a value for one or more of 
the four safety evaluation areas.
14 Schramm at 551. citing Foster, supra.
15 Schramm, supra
Fall/Winter 2011 II
2. One-third of crash reports, including 
37,000 crashes involving interstate 
carriers, were missing from the 
FMCSA’s database.
3. As of January, 2003, 42 percent of 
the reporting on active carriers 
contained outdated data.
4. For the fiscal year 2002, the average 
time in which to upload crash data 
on carriers took 158 days.
5. Thirteen percent of the 21,000 
crashes and over 70,000 of the 
inspection transactions occurring in 
our 6-month sample period contained 
carrier identification errors, such as 
failure to identify a carrier associated 
with the violation, or in a smaller 
number of instances, identifying the 
wrong carrier.
6. In an estimated 11 percent of the 
inspection errors the wrong carrier 
was held accountable for the SafeStat 
related violation.
7. Problems with the inaccurate data are 
compounded because no effective 
system is in place now to facilitate 
the correction of errors in data 
reporting.
8. Missing crash reports may place a 
lower risk carrier in a deficient 
category because data for a higher 
risk carrier is not included in the 
calculation.
9. The effectiveness of the SafeStat 
scoring and ranking calculations is 
highly dependent on the quality of 
the crash data file, which in the past 
was missing a substantial number of 
reportable crashes.
10. If public dissemination of SafeStat 
results is to continue, the data must 
meet a higher standard. The types 
and magnitude of data problems we
found argue for immediate and 
effective action.16
Perhaps the Schramm court was somehow ruling 
on insufficient or poorly presented evidence, or 
took unfounded rationale without precedent 
from briefs by the parties, but for unknown 
reasons and no proven prior validity, the court 
created a “subsidiary duty” sui generis, that was, 
by objective facts then available, contrary to any 
notion of best practice. Moreover, this newly 
announced duty made it mandatory for brokers 
to look to a source (SafeStat) that had been 
found to be unreliable by the Inspector General’s 
office six months before the Schramm decision 
was published. In fact, the Inspector General’s 
report was clearly saying that the data was 
incomplete, invalid as an indicator of accurate 
reporting on carriers and recommending that the 
SafeStat site be taken out of public view and use 
months before the Schramm court mandated its 
use.
Seemingly, the Schramm court was desperate for 
an empirical source to which brokers and other 
shippers could turn and get a clear indication of 
the safety worthiness of carriers. They 
apparently assumed far greater validity for the 
information to be found on SafeStat than existed. 
With all of the information that was available at 
the time of their decision, they either knew or 
should have known that SafeStat was anything 
but a failsafe source of carrier safety evaluation. 
Still, inexplicably, they created a standard that 
was immediately incapable of confirming 
“reasonable care” or “diligent inquiry”, since the 
source to which the court directed brokers could 
not possibly provide completely valid 
information, and thus, absolutely could not be 
reliable, by definition.
(The reader is invited to test this conclusion 
against any of the ten findings mentioned above
16 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Executive Summary Audit Report No. MH- 
2004-034. February 13. 2004; http://\v\v\v.oin.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2004034.pdf
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in the Inspector General’s audit of 2004; e. g., if 
11 percent of the inspection errors were 
attributed to the wrong carrier, how may we 
reliably make any determination as to the carrier 
we are researching? If 74% of the registered 
carriers did not have sufficient data represented, 
how was the broker in Schramm to know with 
reliability whether the carrier they were 
researching was among them? If in 11 percent 
of the inspection errors the wrong carrier was 
held accountable for the SafeStat violation, how 
was the broker to know whether the carrier they 
were researching was among these wrongfully 
charged with a violation.)
All indications of the unreliable nature of 
SafeStat continued to mount from the time of the 
Schramm decision. By 2007, the Inspector 
General made the following findings and 
recommendations:
• We found that, although improvements 
have been made, problems still exist 
with the reporting of crash data.
• Completeness of data is critical for 
SafeStat because scoring involves a 
relative safety ranking of one carrier 
against other carriers competing for the 
same business.
• Missing crash reports may place a lower 
risk carrier in a deficient category 
because data for a higher risk carrier is 
not included in the calculation. 
Consequently, FMCSA should continue 
to limit public use until it can assess 
whether significant crash reporting 
problems remain.
• Before FMCSA allows public access to 
SafeStat scores, it must improve its 
ability to measure the completeness of 
non-fatal crash reporting.17
Shortly after the Inspector General reported this 
information to Congress; on February 21, 2008, 
the FMCSA put the following disclaimer (in 
part) on the SafeStat website:
“Caution Urged in the Use of SafeStat Data”
The message that followed this notice included a 
description of how information was reported to 
the FMCSA and problems with variation in that 
data reporting. The description was summarized 
with this statement:
“Accordingly, SafeStat’s ability to 
accurately and objectively assess the 
safety fitness of individual motor carriers 
may be inconsistent and not conclusive 
without additional analysis. " [emphasis 
added]
This announcement confirming the invalidity of 
the SafeStat information on carriers was then 
followed by this boldfaced disclaimer:
WARNING
Because of State data variations,
FMCSA cautions those who seek to use 
SafeStat data analysis system in ways 
not intended by FMCSA. Please be 
aware that use of SafeStat for purposes 
other than identifying and prioritizing 
carriers for FMCSA and state safety 
improvement and enforcement programs 
may produce unintended results and not 
be suitable for certain uses.18
In the same year that the Schramm decision was 
published, the Inspector General’s Office 
concluded that SafeStat was no longer a valid 
measurement device for carrier safety 
worthiness: “FMCSA must act to revalidate the 
SafeStat model because changes have occurred
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Letter from Inspector Genera! Scoval to 
Congressman Petri with attached Briefing, June 19, 2007; http://wMW.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/ 
SAFESTAT.PDF
18 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai. fmesa.dot, gov/SMS/
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since the 1998 study that supported the model’s 
validity.”19 20
The Schramm court established a rule of law that 
was clearly wrong on the date it was announced. 
No clear and reliable safety determination was 
available to the broker in Schramm had they “... 
check[ed] the safety statistics and evaluations of 
the carriers with whom it contracts available on 
the SafeStat database maintained by FMSCA”, 
nor was one available to all the brokers 
henceforth that have been irresponsibly 
burdened by this decision, which is inexplicable 
except for the motive of reaching a social justice 
decision. The FMCSA reporting function that 
had been a failure since its inception in 1999, 
was a failure prior to and on the date of the 
Schramm decision, and continues to be a failure 
to this day, even its present form known as 
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 (CSA 
2010), Safety Management System (SMS), as 
later developed here.
In summary, the SafeStat measurement system of 
carrier safety was invalid and unreliable at the 
time of the ruling in Schramm. Flowever, due to 
a lack of a careful and cogent analysis, courts 
and court decisions have continued to allow 
juries to consider the incredulous notion that 
brokers should have looked to the SafeStat 
system for information on carriers as a part of 
their duty of reasonable care in selecting a 
carrier.-10 Perhaps more important, the unusual 
mandate by a federal court, giving specific 
direction to such an unreliable source, has been 
accepted as procedure that must be followed by 
many who counsel transportation brokers on risk 
management, and cottage industries have been 
created to look for and evaluate information that 
is by any definition unreliable.
III. FMCSA Replaces Safcr/SafeStat with
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
(CSA 2010) and the Safety Management
System (SMS).
The problems with SafeStat and continued 
public outcry, along with Congressional 
oversight and pressure, resulted in the FMCSA 
announcing the agency function that was to 
replace SafeStat as a carrier safety measurement 
system. In their Five-Year Plan for 2006-2011, 
the agency provided the first description of 
CSA-2010:
The intent of CSA 2010 is to establish an 
operational model that will determine 
the relative safety fitness risk attributable 
to every motor carrier and develop 
streamlined approaches to change the 
behavior of poor motor carrier 
operations and their drivers. The CSA 
2010 will ultimately provide FMCSA a 
new modern-operational model that will 
greatly enhance the Agency’s efficiency 
at gathering and properly evaluating a 
greater proportion of the regulated 
population.21
This intent was followed by the rollout of the 
CSA 2010 Operational Model, in December, 
2010, with the following stated purpose: “CSA 
re-engineers the former enforcement and 
compliance process to provide a better view into 
how well large commercial motor vehicle 
carriers and drivers are complying with safety 
rules, and to intervene earlier with those who are 
not.”22
Since the inception of CSA 2010 and the SMS 
measurement categories for carrier safety, this
19 Executive Summary Audit Report, supra, p. iv. (2004).
20 See, Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
21 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, FMCSA Strategic Plan 2006-2011. http://www.tmcsa.dot.tzov/fmesa- 
strategic-plan-102907.htm
22 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, CSA - Compliance, Safety, Accountability, website http:// 
csa. fmesa. dot, cov/about/csa how, aspx
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new alternative has also been found to be invalid 
and unreliable for sueh a purpose. The 
foundation for the conclusion that this 
measurement system is also invalid and 
unreliable for the purpose of determining carrier 
safety with reasonable certainty includes the 
following:
1. Anne Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA, 
stated before Congress that the 
FMCSA will replace SafeStat with 
the Safety Management System 
(SMS), and that the Agency can rate 
only between two and three percent 
of the carrier population annually.23
2. Because of skewed data and 
disproportionate impact on carriers, 
the National Association of Small 
Trucking Companies (NASTC), ct al. 
filed suit against the FMCSA on 
November 29, 2010, seeking a stay 
on the implementation of SMS and 
its ostensible measurements of 
carrier safety (Behavior Analysis and 
Safety Improvement Categories 
“BASICS’').24
3. In a settlement agreement between 
NASTC, et.al., and FMCSA, on 
March 4, 2011, the FMCSA, agreed 
to publish a disclaimer on the SMS 
website, admitting that,
Readers should not draw 
conclusions about a carrier’s
ov erall safety condition simply
based on the data displayed in the
system [emphasis added] Unless a 
motor carrier in the SMS has received
an UNSATISFACTORY, safety rating 
pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or has 
otherwise been ordered to discontinue 
operations by FMCSA, it is 
authorized to operate on the nation’s 
roadways.25
4.During the twelve months that SMS 
has been used by FMCSA to evaluate 
carrier safety, there have been 
numerous database changes, with the 
following noted as deficiencies in 
fairly rating all carriers within the 
test states:
• Only 11 percent of regulated carriers 
have any scores.
• Crash data includes both preventable 
and non-preventable accidents. Less 
than 4 percent of regulated carriers 
have crash data included.
• “Unsafe driving” scores are recorded 
only in conjunction with roadside 
inspections, and measure only 4.8 
percent of the regulated carriers.
• The “fatigued driving” BASIC 
measures only 2.5 percent of the 
regulated carriers.
• “Vehicle maintenance” measures 
only 9 percent of the industry.
• “Driver fitness” measures only 2 
pcrcentof the industry. Most points 
are accumulated for drivers not 
having medical cards in their 
possession - not for actual 
disqualifying medical conditions.26
Sueh uncertainty and lack of validity to critical 
mass measurement of all regulated carriers has 
led to concern by financial institutions and the 
capital markets invested in the transportation
; Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure Subcommittee On I lighways And Transit U.S. House Of 
Representatives; Statement of Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA;, June 23, 2010; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/ 
ne\vs/speeches/Statement-of-Anne-S-Ferro0623 I O.aspx
24 National Association of Small Trucking Companies, et al. v. FMCSA (D.C. C'ir. No. 10-1402)
25 Id., Settlement Agreement, March 4, 2011. Document ID: 1297064
26 U.S. Department of Transportation. Paul E Green and Daniel Blower. Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model 
Test, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, FMCSA-RRA-11-019 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2011), 
p. 27.
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industry. One such company, Wells Fargo 
Securities, LLC, completed a thorough statistical 
analysis and reported their findings on 
November 4, 2011,
In fact, according to our analysis of the 
200 largest carriers in the CSA 
database, we find no meaningful 
statistical relationship between actual 
accident frequency and BASIC scores 
for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or 
Driver Fitness... we feel BASIC scores 
should not be used exclusively in 
assessing carrier risk and that they may, 
in fact, provide misleading 
information.27
Unfortunately, since the installation of CSA 
2010 and its measurement devices for carrier 
safety contained within the SMS; brokers, 
shippers and carriers are left with another 
unreliable measurement system for carrier safety. 
While CSA 2010 and its measurement system, 
SMS, are the successors to SafeStat, no court has 
yet been required to rule on whether brokers 
have the duty to look to the carrier safety 
information within SMS. However, brokers 
operate daily under the threat of vicarious 
liability should they fail to follow the mandate of 
the Schramm Court, and A. .check the safety 
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with 
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA.”28 29
Never has a court offered any more meaningless 
and completely counterproductive direction.
The paranoia and complete uncertainty 
surrounding the “new” duty of reasonable care 
for brokers in selecting carriers should never 
have come to be. It was originated by bad 
analysis, and over-reaching judicial direction to
an invalid source of inquiry. The complete 
impossibility of this new duty of care has been 
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, by the 
bandwagon tendency for some who advise 
brokers to parrot the Schramm decision, and 
advise that brokers must “... check the safety 
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with 
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA”. Rhetorically, 
and in fact, we must ask: To find what, exactly, 
which might be reliable?
It was bad advice when originated by the 
Schramm Court, for all the reasons outlined 
herein, and it is bad advice today. In light of all 
the information that has been generated and even 
the admissions of the FMCSA, for brokers to 
originate and perpetuate a business process that 
requires them “...to check the safety statistics 
and evaluations of the carriers with whom [they] 
contract...” on either the former SafeStat 
system, or its successor, the SMS, amounts to 
drinking the proverbial Kool-Aid. A better 
argument could perhaps be made that it is 
negligence per se for brokers to make a 
judgment about the safety worthiness of carriers 
from what has been demonstrated to be 
unreliable and certainly incomplete information 
currently found on the SMS. They will never be 
able to substantiate diligent inquiry by referring 
to bits and pieces of unreliable data.
How can such an inquiry satisfy any meaningful 
duty of due care, when the FMCSA directly 
contradicts such advice on the SMS website with 
their very clear disclaimer, “Readers should not 
draw' conclusions about a carrier's overall 
safety’ condition simply based on the data 
displayed in the system."2'’ Further, as if the 
disclaimer is not enough, FMCSA adds in its 
explanation of what SMS is, and is not, “[t]he 
SMS results displayed on the SMS website are
27 CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear Outcomes; Anthony Gallo, CFA, Senior Analyst; Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Equity 
Research Department, November 4, 2011
2S Schramm , supra
29 FMCSA. Safety Management System, http:/'ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Data/ 
carrier.aspx?enc^KxcVSWt’Ecav9s9SnBUikeRZBvr+pUdovFGgZJQl 8\vi>s~
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not intended to imply any federal safety rating of 
the carrier pursuant to 49 USC 31144.,m 
[emphasis added] That being so, we must ask 
was there ever any valid reason for brokers being 
sent into this nightmare of "checking safety 
statistics and evaluations of carriers”? The 
answer is clearly, no! It resulted from bad law 
and lack of understanding of just how 
completely invalid the information was at the 
bottom of the rabbit hole chosen by the 
Schramm Court.
IV. How Must This Folly Be Corrected?
By different means and methods, a strong 
consensus must be achieved by both courts and 
Congress that the FMCSA is the only entity 
charged with determining the relative safety of 
commercial carriers. The nonsense must end. 
Laypersons must not be charged with looking at 
experimental and, so far, invalid tools in a futile 
effort to somehow document “diligent inquiry” 
from information that by definition is unreliable 
as an indicator of current and complete 
information on all carriers (and therefore, on the 
carrier they are researching).
Congressional oversight of the FMCSA has been 
lacking in requiring of FMCSA proper 
accountability for their primary responsibility, at 
least since the introduction of the SafeStat 
system in 1999. No further Inspector General 
audits and warnings should be required before 
the FMCSA is either to admit that their 
responsibility cannot be achieved by current 
means, or completely sanction the rating of all 
carriers for which they have not made a 
determination of “UNSATISFACTORY”, 
consistent with their own construction of their 
duty,
Unless a motor carrier in the SMS has 
received an UNSATISFACTORY, safety 
rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or 
has otherwise been ordered to 
discontinue operations by FMCSA, it is 
authorized to operate on the nation’s 
roadways.30 1
There is in this advisory an immediate dilemma 
for FMCSA if they, or the courts, suggest that 
brokers should not be limited in their duty of 
diligent inquiry to relying exclusively upon a 
search for an “Unsatisfactory” rating, or not. To 
suggest that a broker, with limited resources, 
must look into the maze of unreliable 
information, or infer relative safety from 
BASICs that may be distorted for all the reasons 
discussed herein, is to say that the broker (and 
the public) cannot rely upon FMCSA to 
authorize only safe carriers. Courts should in the 
future be reluctant to hold a broker, with limited 
understanding and reasons to believe that SMS 
data may be unreliable, culpable for selecting a 
carrier that has been authorized by FMCSA, 
with their vast investment in measurement 
systems with which to designate carriers as 
“authorized”.
Title 49, U.S.Code § 31 144, requires the 
Secretary of Transportation (delegated to 
FMCSA per 49 CFR 385) to:
(1) determine whether an owner or 
operator is fit to operate safely 
commercial motor vehicles, utilizing 
among other things the accident record 
of an owner or operator operating in 
interstate commerce and the accident 
record and safety inspection record of 
such owner or operator -
(2) periodically update such safety 
fitness determinations;
30 SMS Information Center, What is the Motor Carrier Safety Management System (SMS)?, http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/ 
SMS/InfoCenter/default.aspx#question 1.
31 SMS Website, supra
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(3) make such final safety fitness 
determinations readily available to 
the public;
There is no reasonable construction of this 
statutory language that would impose upon 
shippers, brokers and third-party logistics 
companies the duty of determining whether a 
carrier is safe. That is a statutory duty of the 
Department of Transportation, through the 
offices of their administrative agency, the 
FMCSA. There is no statutory or regulatory 
authority for the FMCSA to delegate this 
responsibility to members of the public who 
must choose a motor carrier from those 
registered with the FMCSA. There is no 
statutory or regulatory authority that allows a 
SafeStat or SMS measurement category (i.e., 
“BASICs”) to be used as a “safety rating” in lieu 
of the procedure prescribed by 49 CFR 385, 
which by regulation mandates the statutory duty 
of the FMCSA to “make such final safety fitness 
determinations readily available to the public;”32 33
49 C.F.R. § 385.1 Purpose and Scope, provides:
(a) This part establishes FMCSA’s
procedures to determine the safety fitness 
of motor carriers, to assign safety> ratings, 
to direct motor carriers to take remedial 
action when required, and to prohibit 
motor carriers determined to be unfit 
from operating a CMV. [emphasis added]
If we are to understand the confusion that has 
been created by the FMCSA and exacerbated by 
some courts, we must understand the difference 
between this clear statutory duty and what has 
resulted by years of FMCSA focus on safety 
management controls, as a means of achieving 
the ultimate objective and statutory duty to 
provide ‘ final safety' fitness determinations ”n, 
i.e., assign safety ratings.
These helpful distinctions are made at 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.3 Definitions and acronyms:
• Safety fitness determination means the 
final determination by FMCSA that a 
motor carrier meets the safety fitness 
standard under §385.5
• Safety' rating or rating means a rating of 
“Satisfactory”, “Conditional” or 
“Unsatisfactory ”, which the FMCSA 
assigns to a motor carrier using the 
factors prescribed in § 385.7
FMCSA database measurement tools such as the 
former SafeStat, or the current SMS, are not 
safety' fitness determinations or safety ratings. 
They are measurement tools that remain under 
development toward validity and reliability.
They should be viewed as such in the future by 
courts considering the admissibility of such 
uncertain data. While they are under 
development, and until completely valid, they 
should not be viewed by the public in lieu of or 
in search of a statutorily required safety rating. 
[emphasis added]
The former SafeStat and current SMS 
measurement categories have been proven to be 
nothing more than incomplete attempts to gather 
metrics with which the FMCSA can make fitness 
determinations and safety ratings. THEY ARE 
NOT COMPLETED SAFETY RATINGS! It 
follows that when such tools are of questionable 
validity and reliability, they should be kept from 
the public view, rather than be mistakenly 
designated by courts as sources to which brokers 
must look. To do so would avoid the many dire 
consequences brought about by misleading the 
shipping public, and the courts that have 
misguidedly given these invalid tools 
undeserved credence as part of common law 
duties.
32 49 U.S. Code § 31144 (3)
33 Id.
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A. Suggested Congressional Action
The FMCSA has completely failed to fulfill the 
statutory and regulatory duty of providing to the 
public accurate and timely safety ratings on all 
registered carriers. This failure is glaring and 
complete, since the inception of the FMCSA in 
1999. There has never been a time, since the 
inception of the FMCSA, that they have been 
able to publish a “final safety fitness 
determination” for all, or even a significant 
portion of the active interstate motor carriers.
As of December 23, 2011, the FMCSA reports:
• 792,704 active interstate motor 
carriers, with 118,327 (14.92%) of 
these having a safety rating of cither 
Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory.
• 338,380 For Hire interstate motor 
carriers, with 61,067 (18%) of these 
having a safety rating of either 
Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory
• 454,324 Private interstate motor 
carriers, with 57,260 (12.6%) of 
these having a safety rating of either 
Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory34
Since Administrator Anne Ferro states that the 
FMCSA can only rate two or three percent of the 
motor carriers annually35, it is unknown how 
many of these are current, but by mathematical 
certainty, many are so old they are meaningless 
as far as current safety worthiness. While 
spending $45 million on CSA 2010 since 2007, 
and requesting $78 million for 2012,36 the 
FMCSA has created new measurement 
categories for "intervention” (of questionable 
validity and reliability), but has not created a
system that can give a definitive and final Safety 
Rating on all registered carriers. Their delegated 
duty, under 49 U.S. Code § 31144, is to 
“determine whether an owner or operator is fit to 
operate safely commercial motor vehicles...”, 
and to, “make such final safety fitness 
determinations readily available to the public”, 
[emphasis added]
The FMCSA claims, “The CSA 2010 will 
ultimately provide FMCSA a new modem- 
operational model that will greatly enhance the 
Agency’s efficiency at gathering and properly 
evaluating a greater proportion of the regulated 
population.” Flowever, only 11 percent of 
registered carriers had any scores in the CSA 
Safety Management System as of August 2011,37 
and of those with scores at least one significant 
study found, “...no meaningful statistical 
relationship between actual accident frequency 
and BASIC scores for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued 
Driving or Driver Fitness.”38
Congress should focus on clarifying for the 
FMCSA exactly what their duties and priorities 
should be. At the current pace the FMCSA will 
have spent over 120 million dollars on CSA 
2010 by the end of budget year 2012, and at best 
they have created a data recording system that 
has questionable value for predicting carrier 
safety for less than twenty percent of the 
750,000 registered motor carriers. They still 
have no system that accomplishes the rating of 
all carriers as either; Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory. I lowevcr, because of some 
confused judicial understanding of exactly what 
the SafeStat and SMS measurement systems can 
provide, the FMCSA’s continued publication of 
SMS BASICs measurements imply to the public, 
and to some courts, that such data is valid for
34 FMCSA data base response to Freedom of Information Act inquiry, December 23, 2011.
35 See. Note 22
36 United States Government Accountability Office; Susan Fleming Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; Report to 
Congress, February 25, 2011; GAO-11-416R
37 Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test, supra
38 Wells Fargo, supra.
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evaluating a clear determination of carrier safety. 
It simply is not.
Congress must recognize FMCSA’s clear failure 
to provide final and timely Safety Ratings on all 
registered motor carriers, and that within the 
context of this failure they have caused courts 
and the shipping public to be confused and 
burdened as to a reasonable and fair process for 
determining the safety worthiness of authorized 
motor carriers. As a first step in correcting this 
failure they should require FMCSA to remove 
from public view the developmental data 
(BASICs) now being displayed within the SMS. 
By FMCSA’s own admission, its visibility and 
decisions made there from may have unintended 
consequences. Removing this data from public 
view will also relieve brokers and the shipping 
public from the mistaken judicial inference that 
such data is a reliable source for a final Safety 
Rating. Finally, and most import, requiring the 
FMCSA to remove this incomplete 
“intervention” data disabuses the notion that 
brokers and other shippers should have a duty to 
refer to it as a part of their diligent inquiry and 
duty of reasonable care.
Once such data is removed from public view, 
FMCSA may continue to develop it to a point of 
reliability and perhaps increased efficiency in 
performing their duty to provide final safety 
determinations and safety ratings on all 
registered carriers. In the interim, Congress, the 
transportation industry, shipping public and 
courts should not get confused by the FMCSA’s 
apparent effort to rationalize and obfuscate their 
failure to fulfill their statutory and regulatory 
duty to provide to the public, “... final safety 
fitness determinations”39 [emphasis added].
They simply have not done so in their entire 
existence.
B. Future Jurisprudence Must Provide a
Duty of Reasonable Care for Brokers
That Corrects the Imputed Duty to Refer
to an Invalid Data Source
As has been demonstrated, the Schramm court 
required brokers to refer to a system of carrier 
safety evaluation (SafeStat) that was full of error, 
invalid and unreliable on the day their decision 
was announced. The successor to SafeStat,
SMS, is at best a work in progress and is also 
invalid and unreliable as a definitive Safety 
Rating on motor carriers. It is clearly disclaimed 
as such by its originator, FMCSA.40 Future 
litigators, and courts who hear such cases, must 
develop a remedial standard of due care for 
brokers that eliminates the Hobson’s choice of 
being required to refer to the SMS measurement 
system for a definitive Safety Rating. For the 
vast majority of registered carriers it simply is 
not there. If it is there it is of questionable 
relevance due to issues of timeliness, errors in 
reporting and ratios computed that are 
imbalanced with greater weight to larger 
carriers.
So much more is known (than at the time of the 
Schramm decision) about the likely unreliability 
of SMS data that courts should be more inclined 
to exclude it as irrelevant, lacking in probative 
value, confusing and untrustworthy. The Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the corollary state rules, 
have many provisions that should be considered 
in motions in limine that fully develop the 
questionable relevance, probative value, 
confusion factor and hearsay nature of many of 
the data categories within SMS.
• Fed.R.Evid. 401 says, "Relevant
evidence” means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more
39 Title 49, U.S.Code § 31144(3)
40 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai.1mcsa.dot.yov/SMS/
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probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.
• Fed.R.Evid. 403 prov ides that even 
relevant information may be excluded if 
its probative value is outweighed by a 
danger that the evidence could be 
confusing, misleading or a waste of the 
court’s time.
• Fed.R.Evid. 803 (8) denies the 
admission of government reports or data 
compilations in civil actions if the 
sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.
Assume that a broker researches a carrier and 
finds proper authority, regulatory insurance in 
place and a safety rating other than 
Unsatisfactory. The broker concludes that the 
carrier is properly authorized by FMCSA, and 
the broker has no current knowledge of 
incompetence or unsafe operations by the carrier. 
The broker knows that the SMS data is 
incomplete and that it may contain BASICs data 
that is incomplete and outdated, with ratios that 
are skewed by large carrier presence, and that a 
reputable statistical study concluded “...we find 
no meaningful statistical relationship between 
actual accident frequency and BASIC scores for 
Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or Driver 
Fitness”.41
Is admission of the SMS data, or broker's failure 
to look at such data, fairly likely to make it more 
or less probable that the broker was negligent? 
Given the established unreliability of the former 
SafeStat information, and the current state of 
confusion regarding SMS measures, is there any 
context in which the SMS data should not be 
excluded under Rule 403? Given the FMCSA’s 
acknowledgement that SMS data is not a safety 
rating, but rather for internal intervention 
purposes, along with their disclaimers and
published acknowledgment that all carriers are 
authorized to operate on the nation’s roadways, 
unless they have been given an Unsatisfactory 
safety rating, is it more or less likely that 
presentation of SMS data is both confusing and 
untrustworthy under Rule 803 (8)?
It is suggested that more courts should rule as 
the Middle District Court of Georgia did when 
requested to take judicial notice of safety ratings 
published on the former SafeStat, finding that 
such data was not reliable evidence routinely 
contemplated by the rules governing judicial 
notice.42
CONCLUSION
V. Conclusion: Returning to a Sensible
Duty of Care for Brokers
It has been argued herein that brokers and third- 
party logistics companies were for many years 
under a reasonable standard of care in selecting 
carriers, before the Schramm decision 
erroneously required that they refer to a source 
(SafeStat) that was invalid and unreliable in 
order to meet their duty of diligent inquiry and 
reasonable care. Furthermore, for all the reasons 
stated herein, the successor to SafeStat,
FMCSA’s Safety Management System, is as 
untrustworthy, if not more so.
With the proven failure of the FMCSA to 
provide final safety determinations and safety 
ratings for the vast majority of registered motor 
carriers, there simply is no definitive source with 
which brokers can make a meaningful 
determination of carrier safety. They are left 
with only a semblance of such a source. They 
can do as they have done for many years and 
refer to the safety rating provided by the 
FMCSA, in those instances where it is available. 
If such a rating is not available, surely the broker
41 Wells Fargo, supra
42 See FCCI Ins. Group v. Rodgers Metal Craft. Inc., 2008 WL 4185997 (M.D. Ga. 2008)
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cannot he negligent for failure to infer one from 
what has been shown to be unreliable 
information.
The FMCSA has clearly failed its statutory duty, 
which in turn means that the Department of 
Transportation has failed to provide to the public 
“final safety determinations” and “safety ratings” 
as mandated by 49 U.S. Code § 31144.
Congress has failed to properly recognize the 
magnitude of this failure and require 
accountability from FMCSA. Within this 
context, the courts have failed by requiring of 
brokers and third-party logistics companies a 
responsibility that could not be fulfilled, no 
matter how long they might look as SMS 
BASICs data. It is time for the Congress, 
FMCSA and the courts to realize the nature and 
significance of this folly, and restore to brokers 
and third-party logistics companies, who are 
least culpable, a standard of care that is realistic 
and takes into consideration the magnitude of 
what has been wrought from the confusion on 
this issue.
Congress must ask the FMCSA for answers to 
the following: Can they provide to the public 
final determinations of safety on all registered 
carriers? If not. how do they intend to comply 
with their statutory duty to do so? In asking 
these question and listening to FMCSA’s 
response, Congress should not be distracted by 
FMCSA’s rhetoric about “intervention”...it is 
not the same as providing safety ratings. If 
developmental data such as BASICs is a worthy 
element of ultimately getting to the ability to 
provide safety ratings, then let it be recognized 
as such and not as a rationalization for their 
failure to perform their primary duty. It follows 
that brokers should not be assigned this duty 
with the intractable information now admitted by 
FMCSA to be less than reliable for such a 
purpose.43
The courts who in the future consider the duty of 
brokers to use reasonable care in the selection of 
carriers should do so with recognition of the 
errors of the past. Such judicial reformation 
might start with a more careful analysis of the 
real role of brokers in the facilitation of 
providing carriers for loads and loads for 
carriers. It must also take into consideration that 
some of the prior decisions that have imposed 
impossible standards upon brokers have perhaps 
been motivated by subjective reasoning. Courts 
w ho reconsider the duty of brokers, in light of 
the mistakes of the Schramm decision, might 
consider the reasoning of Judge Smith of the 
Georgia Court of Appeals,
...we arc troubled by the result in 
this case... We cannot, however, 
allow our sympathy for the plight of 
those injured by commercial trucks 
to lead us toward imposing strict 
liability on a party that does not 
possess the requisite degree of 
control over another's conduct.
Resolution of this public policy issue 
lies with the legislative branch of our 
government, not with the judiciary.44
In the interim the courts can return to a more 
sensible notion that carrier safety is administered 
by FMCSA, and FMCSA has a statutory duty to 
provide a final safety determination and safety 
rating. Brokers and other third parties cannot 
fairly be charged with this duty. It is reasonable 
to suggest that this was the recognition of all 
courts who considered this issue for the fifty 
years preceding the Schramm decision.
* Readers should note that the formatting in this 
article is reserved for Law' Review style articles. 
Regular research oriented articles should be 
formatted in conformance with the Journal’s 
Submission Guidelines.
43 See Note 24
44 Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 666 ,E.2d 567, (Ga. App., 2008)
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